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 chapter 4
EU Citizenship as a Means of Broadening 
the Application of EU Fundamental Rights: 
Developments and Limits
Katerina Kalaitzaki*
i Introduction
The EU is no longer an organisation which merely pursues economic ob-
jectives but is also evolving towards a more political and constitutionalised 
Union. The article supports the idea that the political integration in the do-
main of EU fundamental rights is primarily evolving through a ‘triangular’, 
inter- connected system of protection, including the constructivist transfor-
mation of EU citizenship, the institutionalised developments of EU law,1 and 
the protection of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law. Yet major 
components of a comprehensive and all- embracing fundamental rights pol-
icy are still absent, which is even more perceptible during periods of crisis, 
such as the recent financial crisis, where the gaps in citizens’ rights protection 
became evident due to the difficulties encountered in challenging the con-
sequences of the conditionality imposed.2 This deficient protection largely 
derived from the restricted scope of application of fundamental rights under 
the Charter, its unstable judicial interpretation, and in turn from the unwill-
ingness of the Court to rule on complex financial cases. The financial crisis 
and its mechanisms constitute a useful case study from which to assess the 
modern ‘triangular’ protection of rights and encourage interest in assessing 
new legal paths to reinforce it.
Although EU citizenship has not played a substantial role in the financial 
crisis, this article suggests that it is not constrained to its current, ‘confined’ 
 * Early Career Fellow in European Union Law, Edinburgh Law School.
 1 Kostakopoulou, D. (2005). Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional 
Change. The Modern Law Review 68 (2), pp. 233– 267, 250 et seq.
 2 Menéndez, A.J. (2013). The Existential Crisis of the European Union. German Law Journal 14 
(5), pp. 453– 526, 455.
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form, since it is designed to encounter constant evolution and progress.3 Its 
constructive character culminated in the judicially developed ‘substance of 
the rights’ doctrine, which has substantially altered the architecture of EU fun-
damental rights protection towards including purely internal violations within 
the Union’s scope, if they amount to emptying Union citizenship rights of their 
substantive meaning. When placed within a new jurisdictional test, the doc-
trine can arguably fill the gaps of the current protection system in an effort to 
link EU fundamental and citizenship rights and propose an alternative, more 
effective use of rights.
ii Setting the Scene: Legal Characteristics of the ‘Triangular’ 
Fundamental Rights Protection System
The first corner of the ‘triangle’ is the legal concept of Union citizenship,4 which 
constituted a decisive step towards a constitutionalised Union;5 although a rel-
evant personal status had clearly matured long before its formal incorporation 
in the Maastricht Treaty.6 The list of rights provided under Article 20 tfeu, 
although non- exhaustive, fell short of establishing the full range of modern 
citizenship rights,7 since no legal connection was declared with fundamental 
rights. The Commission however, defined EU citizenship as a dynamic con-
cept which should always reflect ‘the aims of the Union, […] stemming from 
the gradual and coherent development of the Union’s political, economic and 
 3 Union citizenship, Contributions by the Commission to the Intergovernmental Conference 
sec (91) 500 Bull EC Supp. 2/ 91, p. 87; Closa, C.  (1992). The Concept of Citizenship in the 
Treaty on European Union. Common Market Law Review 29 (6), pp. 1137– 1169, 1167.
 4 Kostakopoulou, D. (2005). Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship, cit., p. 250.
 5 Wiener, A. (1999). The Constructive Potential of Citizenship: building European Union. Policy 
& Politics 27 (3), pp. 271– 293.
 6 Kochenov, D., and Plender, R. (2012). EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient 
Substance? The Discovery of the Treaty Text. European Law Review 37, pp. 369– 396; Welge, 
R. (2015). Union Citizenship as Demoi- cratic Institution: Increasing the EU’s Subjective Legit-
imacy Through Supranational Citizenship. Journal of European Public Policy 22 (1), pp. 56– 74; 
Kostakopoulou, T.  (2010). Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the European Union:  be-
tween Past and Future. Manchester: Manchester University Press; O’Leary, S. The relationship 
between Community citizenship and the protection of fundamental rights in Community 
law. Common Market Law Review 32 (2), pp. 519– 554, 519.
 7 European Parliament (1991). Bindi Report on Union Citizenship. Doc. A 3- 0139/ 91, 23 May 
1991; Closa, C. (1995). Citizenship of the Union and Nationality of Member States. Common 
Market Law Review 32 (2), pp. 487– 518, 490.
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social dimension’.8 It has indeed proved to be of ‘constructivist’ nature, espe-
cially through the Court of Justice’s case law, by deepening European integra-
tion, based on a federal logic, while broadening the potential impact on EU 
fundamental rights. Namely, after Martínez Sala,9 EU citizenship demonstrat-
ed a shift away from ‘economic and market citizens’, to a social and political 
dimension,10 while establishing protection against discrimination based on 
nationality and a free- standing right to move and reside freely.11 The construc-
tivist nature of EU citizenship culminated with the inclusion of new, unwritten 
rights into the concept, through the ‘substance of the rights doctrine’.
Regardless of the influence exerted by EU citizenship in forming current 
policies, a significant role was also played by the ‘effects of institutional in-
teraction’,12 such as the Charter, whose list of rights is far more extensive, as 
it reunites a wide range of rights and freedoms  – including socioeconomic 
rights  – which have been violated the most during the financial crisis.13 On 
the contrary, considering the nature of the two concepts, the list under EU 
citizenship might currently be limited, but its constructivist nature arguably 
allows for expansion of the ‘inter alia list’ under Article 20 tfeu. Therefore, 
 8 Union citizenship, Contributions by the Commission to the Intergovernmental Confer-
ence, cit., p. 87.
 9 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 May 1998, case C- 85/ 96, María Martínez Sala v. Freistaat 
Bayern.
 10 O’Leary, S. (1999). Putting Flesh on the Bones of European Union Citizenship. European 
Law Review 24 (1), pp. 68– 79; Kochenov, D. (2009). Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European 
Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship between status and Rights. Columbia Journal of 
European Law 15 (1), pp.169– 237, 173 et seq.
 11 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 September 2004, case C- 456/ 02, Trojani; Court of Justice, 
judgment of 20 September 2001, case C- 184/ 99, Grzelczyk; Barnard, C.  (2013). The 
Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Court of 
Justice, judgment of 17 September 2002, case C- 413/ 99, Baumbast and R, para. 83; Court of 
Justice, judgment of 26 October 2006, case C- 192/ 05, Tas- Hagen and Tas; Opinion of AG 
Kokott delivered on 30 March 2006, case C- 192/ 05, Tas- Hagen Tas, para. 33.
 12 Kostakopoulou, D. (2005). Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship, cit., p. 264; Liisberg, 
J.B. (2001). Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of 
Community Law? Article 53 of the Charter:  a fountain of law of just an inkblot. Jean 
Monnet Working Paper, no. 4/ 01, p. 7; Lenaerts, K. (2012). Exploring the Limits of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. European Constitutional Law Review 8 (3), pp. 375– 403; 
Arestis, G. (2013). Fundamental Rights in the EU: Three years after Lisbon, the Luxembourg 
Perspective. College of Europe Cooperative Research Papers No. 2/ 2013, p. 2; Schneider, C.B. 
(2014). The evolution of the first Bill of Rights of the European Union and its position 
within the constellation of national and regional fundamental rights protection systems. 
Bridging Europe Working Paper, p. 2 et seq.
 13 Peers, S., Hervey, T., Kenner, J., and Ward, A., eds. (2014). The EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights A Commentary. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
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while the list of rights under the Charter adequately incorporates the rights vi-
olated during the financial crisis, the precise extent of Union citizenship rights 
cannot be clearly defined from a strictly textual perspective. However, it is gen-
erally believed that the essence of EU citizenship is much broader than the list 
provided by Article 20(2) tfeu, in the broader sense of what supranational 
citizenships entail.14
The third piece of the EU triangular system is the protection of fundamental 
rights as general principles of EU law, many of which are unwritten and judge- 
made, but the majority of which have been codified in the Treaties over time.15 
They inter alia assist with judicial interpretations and legal reviews,16 but more 
importantly, they are largely used to fill legal gaps where relevant EU laws are 
lacking or do not provide a concrete answer.17 It can thus be argued that gen-
eral principles are both institutional and constructive in nature, since they are 
enshrined in the Treaty, but the Court regularly recognises new rights as falling 
within the ‘general principles umbrella’, under Article 2 teu.
Nevertheless, the effectiveness and potential use of the instruments in a 
crisis, largely depends on their material and/ or personal scope of application 
and the existence of any legal restrictions. The scope of EU citizenship was 
largely based on the logic of economic growth,18 which has arguably dimin-
ished its essence and the attempts made in the Maastricht Treaty to connect 
it with the citizen.19 However, the cjeu has identified an increasing number 
 14 Kochenov, D.  (2017). On Tiles and Pillars:  EU Citizenship as the Federal Denominator. 
In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 26 et seq.
 15 Cuyvers, A. (2017). General Principles of EU law. In: Ugirashebuja, Ruhangisa, Ottervanger, 
and Cuyvers, eds., East African Community Law: Institutional, Substantive and Comparative 
EU Aspects. Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, p. 220.
 16 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 November 1991, joined cases C- 6/ 90 and C- 9/ 90 
Francovich, para. 30; Court of Justice, judgment of 5 March 1996, joined cases C- 46/ 93 and 
C- 48/ 93 Brasserie du Pêcheur, paras. 27– 36; Court of Justice, judgment of 8 April 2004, 
joined cases C- 293/ 12 and 594/ 12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, para. 10.
 17 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 January 2010, case C- 555/ 07, Kücükdeveci, para. 21; Court 
of Justice, judgment of 23 April 1986, case 294/ 83, Les Verts v. Parliament, para. 12.
 18 Kochenov, D.  (2011). A  Real European Citizenship:  A new Jurisdiction Test:  A Novel 
Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe. Columbia Journal of European Law 
18 (1), pp. 56– 109, 61; Nic Shuibhne, N. (2010). The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship. 
Common Market Law Review 47 (6), pp. 1597– 1628, 1621 et seq.; Eeckhout, P. (2002). The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question. Common Market Law Review 39 
(5), pp. 945– 994, 971; Douglas- Scott, S. (1998). In Search of Union Citizenship. Yearbook of 
European Law 18 (1), pp. 29– 65, 30 et seq.
 19 Shaw, J.  (2010). Citizenship:  Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and 
Constitutionalism. Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper Series No. 14/ 2010, p.  11; 
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of ‘citizenship cases in which the element of true movement is either barely 
discernible or non- existent’,20 while the ratione materiae of EU law has been 
further stretched to cover virtually hypothetical cross- border situations.21 EU 
citizenship has further managed to overcome the strict requirement for a cross- 
border element completely, by creating an independent, EU citizenship- based 
right,22 and redefining the material and personal scope of EU citizenship23 to 
allow more cases to fall within the cjeu’s jurisdiction. Most importantly, in 
Ruiz Zambrano the Court ruled that Article 20 tfeu prevents Member States 
from taking measures which have the effect of ‘depriving EU citizens of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of rights conferred on them by the citi-
zenship of the Union’.24 It therefore created the possibility of EU law ‘interven-
ing’, once the enjoyment of the essence of EU citizenship rights is brought into 
question.25
The restriction on the field of application of the Charter under Article 51(1)26 
also severely limits the scope of fundamental rights policies, including the 
relevant jurisdiction for challenges to austerity measures. The Court has not 
accepted the restriction easily, although it continues to be difficult to predict 
whether a domestic measure will be found to be bound by the Charter.27 The 
Spaventa, E. (2008). Seeing the Wood despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship 
and its Constitutional Effects. Common Market Law Review 45 (1), pp. 13– 45, 40.
 20 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 30 September 2010, case C34/ 09 Ruiz Zambrano; 
van Eijken, H., and de Vries, S.A. (2011). A  New Route into the Promised Land? Being 
a European Citizen after Ruiz Zambrano. European Law Review 36 (5), pp.  704– 721, 
710; Tryfonidou, A.  (2008). Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations:  An 
Incongruity in a Citizens’ Europe. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 35 (1), pp. 43– 67, 50 
et seq.; See further: Court of Justice, judgment of 14 October 2008, case C- 353/ 06, Grunkin 
and Paul.
 21 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 October 2004, case C- 200/ 02, Zhu and Chen, para. 45; 
Court of Justice, judgment of 12 July 2005, case C- 403/ 03, Schempp, para. 47; Court of 
Justice, judgment of 2 October 2003, case C- 148/ 02, Garcia Avello, para. 45; Spaventa, 
E. (2008). Seeing the Wood despite the Trees, cit., p. 21.
 22 O’Brien, C. (2016).“Hand- to- mouth” citizenship: decision time for the UK Supreme Court 
on the substance of Zambrano rights, EU citizenship and equal treatment. Journal of 
Social Welfare and Family Law 38 (2), pp.228– 245, 229 et seq.
 23 Rottmann, cit.
 24 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 March 2011, case C- 34/ 09, Ruiz Zambrano, para. 42.
 25 Tryfonidou, A.  (2008). Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations, cit., p.  50 
et seq.
 26 Fontanelli, F.  (2014). The Implementation of European Union Law by Member States 
under Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Columbia Journal of European 
Law 20 (2), pp. 194– 247, 193 et seq.
 27 Ibid., p. 193.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Katerina Kalaitzaki - 9789004433076
Downloaded from Brill.com12/15/2020 10:53:09AM
via free access
Broadening the Application of EU Fundamental Rights 49
Court has interestingly interpreted ‘implementation’ under Article 51(1) broad-
ly as meaning to ‘fall within the scope of EU law’.28 In Fransson29 a remote 
connection with EU law was enough to trigger the Charter, stressing how much 
grey area remains in the interpretation of this provision. The scope of EU fun-
damental rights is therefore interpreted variously, with the Charter being more 
likely to apply to national rules in cases with a stronger EU interest, while ap-
plying only in extreme cases regarding the co- ordination of rules.30 Therefore, 
although the Court has interpreted Article 51(1) broadly, the level of discretion 
available allows it to promote a differentiated understanding of the Charter’s 
scope of application in selected cases. The vagueness and uncertainty deriving 
therefrom,31 was also criticised by the European Parliament, stating that the 
citizens’ expectations “go beyond the Charter’s strictly legal provisions” and 
called on the Commission to do more to meet citizens’ expectations.32 With-
in the framework of strengthening the protection of EU fundamental rights, 
the Parliament had even proposed the deletion of Article 51 of the Charter,33 
recognising the structural difficulties it creates. A reinforced system, towards 
a truly constitutionalised Union, could be achieved by adopting a broader and 
more stable use of the Charter, to make rights more visible to citizens, espe-
cially in situations which are firmly within the scope of EU law or have a clear 
connection with it, such as those of the European Stability Mechanism (esm).
General principles of EU law are also invoked when ‘implementing Union 
law’, in view of the fact that almost all Charter rights have been previously rec-
ognised as general principles.34 Unlike the Charter, however, due to their hy-
brid nature, the scope of application of general principles is not as restricted.35 
 28 Court of Justice, judgment of 18 June 1991, case C- 260/ 89, ERT v. DEP, para. 42; Court of 
Justice, judgment of 13 June 1996, case C- 144/ 95, Maurin.
 29 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 February 2013, case C- 617/ 10, Åkerberg Fransson; 
Spaventa, E.  (2016). The interpretation of Article 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights:  The Dilemma of Stricter or Broader Application of the Charter to National 
Measures. European Parliament’s PETI Committee PE 556.930.
 30 Spaventa, E.  (2016). The interpretation of Article 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, cit., p. 10.
 31 Fontanelli, F. (2014). The Implementation of European Union Law by Member States, cit., 
p. 200.
 32 European Parliament resolution of 21 January 2016 on the activities of the Committee of 
Petitions, 2014, (2014/ 2218(INI)), para. 24.
 33 European Parliament resolution of 27 February 2014 on the situation of fundamental 
rights in the European Union (2012) (2013/ 2078(INI)), para. 15.
 34 van den Brink, M.J. (2012). EU Citizenship and EU Fundamental Rights:  Taking EU 
Citizenship Rights Seriously. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 39 (2), pp. 273– 289, 287.
 35 Tridimas, T.  (2013). Horizontal Effect of General Principles:  Bold Rulings and Fine 
Distinctions. In: Bernitz, Groussot, and Schulyok, eds., General Principles of EU Law and 
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According to AG Bot in his Opinion in Scattolon, the restrictive scope of appli-
cation defined for the Charter was not intended to restrict the scope of appli-
cation of the fundamental rights recognised as general principles of EU law,36 
which can still be invoked where the Charter cannot. Therefore, in terms of 
the scope of application of the respective instruments, it is argued that a con-
structivist understanding of EU citizenship can more effectively overcome its 
restrictions compared to the Charter, demonstrating its greater potential for 
safeguarding citizens’ rights.37
iii The Modern Protection of Fundamental Rights
To cope with the financial crisis and safeguard financial stability in the euro 
area,38 new mechanisms were adopted,39 including the permanent esm, 
which was established as an international, intergovernmental Treaty (esmt)40 
concluded and ratified by the Member States outside the EU legal order. Ac-
cordingly, Article 136(3) tfeu states that the mechanism is activated if indis-
pensable to safeguarding the stability of the euro area as a whole, subject to 
strict conditionality,41 which is agreed under the relevant memoranda of un-
derstanding (MoUs). As a way to alleviate budgetary concerns, conditionality 
is based on austerity and includes reductions in public spending, cuts in wages 
European Private Law. Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer; Lenaerts K., and Gutiérrez- 
Fons, J.A. (2010). The constitutional allocation of powers and general principles of EU law. 
Common Market Law Review 47 (6), pp. 1629– 1669, 1640; Court of Justice, judgment of 13 
July 1989, case 5/ 88, Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft.
 36 Opinion of AG Bot delivered on 5 April 2011, case C- 108/ 10, Scattolon, para. 120.
 37 Kochenov, D. (2011). A Real European Citizenship, cit., p. 61.
 38 Tuori, K. (2014). The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis by Kaarlo Tuori and Klaus 
Tuori, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; European Commission (2015). Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area. Economic and Financial Affairs 14 (2), p. 28, http:// ec.europa.
eu/ economy_ finance/ publications/ eeip/ pdf/ ip001_ en.pdf; Regulation (EU) 407/ 2010 of 
the Council of 11 May 2010 on establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism; 
Council Document 9614/ 10 of 10 May 2010, OJ L/ 118, 12.05.2010, p. 1– 4.
 39 Rodriguez, P.M. (2016). A missing piece of European emergency law: legal certainty and 
individuals’ expectations in the EU response to the crisis. European Constitutional Law 
Review 12 (2), pp. 265– 293, 270.
 40 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (esm) (2012) D/ 12/ 3, Recitals 
1 and 5.
 41 Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 26 October 2012, case C- 370/ 12, Pringle, paras. 142– 143; 
Craig, P. (2014). Pringle and the Nature of Legal Reasoning. Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law 21 (1), pp. 205– 220, 208 et seq.
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and increases in tax revenues.42 Although necessary for the mechanism to 
work,43 the conditionality imposed was repeatedly challenged for fundamen-
tal rights infringements.44 Due to the diversified legal establishment and the 
use of the financial assistance mechanisms, the judicial challenges have prov-
en arduous,45 while the current protection system has been largely ineffective 
in protecting EU citizens’ rights.
The Court has repeatedly referred to the Charter in its rulings, only to con-
clude in most cases that it cannot be invoked due to a lack of connection with 
EU law. Therefore, leaving aside the level of protection which could actually 
have been offered by the Charter, the Court’s persistent preference for inter-
preting Article 51(1) in the narrowest way possible when in fact a connection 
with EU law could be identified, has led EU citizens to a state of deadlock in 
such actions. This is primarily the case in claims against the Member States, 
which are under a duty to implement the agreed conditionality into national 
laws, in order to restore stability and return to sustainable growth.46 The Court 
in Pringle47 and later in Sindicatos dos Bancarios,48 ruled that the provisions of 
the Charter do not apply to the implementation of the MoUs for the provision 
of stability support under the esm, since the Member States are not imple-
menting Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter.49 The 
 42 Theodoropoulou, S., and Watt, A.(2011). Withdrawal symptoms: an assessment of the aus-
terity packages in Europe. European Trade Union Institute Working papers No. 2/ 2011, p. 11 
et seq. 8.
 43 Gilliams, H.  (2011). Stress Testing the Regulator:  Review of State Aid to Financial 
Institutions after the Collapse of Lehman. European Law Review 36 (1), pp. 3– 25, 5 et seq.; 
Avalos, H.R.B. (2012). Moral Hazard in the Euro- Zone. MPRA Papers No. 61103, p. 2 et seq.; 
Pringle, cit., paras. 69 and 111.
 44 Lusiani, N., and Saiz, I.  (2014). Safeguarding human rights in times of economic cri-
sis. Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, available at https:// rm.coe.int/ 
safeguarding- human- rights- in- times- of- economic- crisis- issue- paper- publ/ 1680908dfa. 
https:// rm.coe.int/ 16806daa3f.
 45 Kilpatrick, C.  (2015). On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency:  The Degradation 
of Basic Legal Values in Europe’s Bailouts. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 35 (2), 
pp. 325– 353, 331.
 46 Financial Assistance Facility Agreement between European Stability Mechanism and 
The Republic of Cyprus as the Beneficiary Member State and Central Bank of Cyprus 
as Central Bank, https:// www.esm.europa.eu/ sites/ default/ files/ esm_ ffa_ cyprus_ publica-
tion_ version_ final.pdf.
 47 Pringle, cit., para. 178.
 48 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 March 2013, case C- 128/ 12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte 
and Others.
 49 Adam, S., and Mena Parras, F.J. (2013). The European Stability Mechanism through the 
legal meanderings of the Union’s constitutionalism: Comment on Pringle. European Law 
Review 38 (6), pp. 848– 865, 850 et seq.; Pringle, cit., para. 180.
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Pringle ruling had raised intense debate, since the esmt, indicates that the EU 
framework should be observed by the esm members, especially ‘the economic 
governance rules’ set out in the tfeu,50 while previous rulings and principles, 
allowed more room for a connecting link with EU law.51
Further reluctance was manifested, in Sindicato Nacional,52 where the 
Court, narrowly ruled that it had no jurisdiction to determine the request 
for preliminary ruling, since no link with EU law was found.53 In contrast, 
although, the Portuguese Government seemed to ‘have gone further than its 
commitments in the MoU’,54 the national legislation also makes express ref-
erence to the Council Decision on granting financial assistance, thus at least a 
remote link between the national measure with EU law was evident. The Court 
of Justice was straightforwardly asked about the validity and interpretation of 
specific provisions implemented in national law in Florescu,55 where it had for 
the first time indicated that since the MoU is an act of the EU institutions, it 
must be regarded as implementing that law according to Article 51(1), despite 
the amount of discretion they have in deciding the implementing measures.56 
As a whole, the Charter failed to protect EU citizens’ rights completely during 
the financial crisis, primarily because the unstable status of the restriction un-
der Article 51(1) allowed the Courts to treat claims against Member States as 
purely internal,57 even when a remote connection with EU law existed. This 
approach largely deprived citizens of the ability to proceed in such litigation to 
the factual assessment of the disputed measures and possible remedies.
 50 Beck, G. (2014). The Court of Justice, legal reasoning, and the Pringle case – law as the 
continuation of politics by other means. European Law Review 39 (2), pp. 234– 250, 240; 
Hinarejos, A.  (2013). The Court of Justice of the EU and the legality of the European 
Stability Mechanism. Cambridge Law Journal 72 (2), pp. 237– 240, 237.
 51 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 February 2009, case C- 45/ 07, Commission v. Greece; Court 
of Justice, judgment of 20 April 2010, case C- 246/ 07 Commission v.  Sweden, para. 91; 
Barnard, C. (2013). The Charter, the Court – and the Crisis. University of Cambridge Faculty 
of Law Research Papers No. 18/ 2013, p. 9.
 52 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 June 2014, case C- 264/ 12, Sindicato Nacional dos 
Profissionais de Seguros e Afins.
 53 See also, Court of Justice, judgment of 10 May 2012, case C- 134/ 12, Corpul Naţional al 
Poliţiştilor.
 54 Barnard, C. (2013). The Charter in time of crisis: a case study of dismissal. In: Countouris, 
and Freedland, eds., Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis. Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, p. 262.
 55 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 June 2017, case C- 258/ 14, Florescu and Others.
 56 Ibid., para. 34.
 57 Kilpatrick, C. (2015). Are the Bailouts Immune to EU Social Challenge Because They Are 
Not EU Law. European Constitutional Review 10 (3), pp. 393– 421, 400.
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The Charter has been more successfully invoked against the acts of the EU 
institutions tasked with negotiating the MoUs and overseeing the austerity 
plan.58 In her view in Pringle, AG Kokott emphasised that the Commission re-
mains a Union institution and is bound by the full extent of EU law, even when 
acting within the framework of the esm.59 Accordingly, the Court in Ledra Ad-
vertising Ltd stated that the Commission retains within the framework of the 
esmt, its role as guardian of the Treaties and should refrain from signing an 
MoU whose consistency with EU law and the Charter is doubtful.60
In contrast, fundamental rights as general principles of EU law have rarely 
been used, and only recently with any positive effect. Specifically, Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses61 questioned the compatibility of austerity mea-
sures imposed on the judiciary with the principle of judicial independence. 
The Court clearly sought to overcome the legal barrier of the Charter by invok-
ing the principle of effective judicial protection under Article 19(1) teu, since 
according to the Court, its material scope goes beyond that of Article 47 of the 
Charter. Although this is a beneficial development for fundamental rights, it is 
another demonstration of the Charter’s weaknesses, forcing the Court to resort 
to concepts from the pre- constitutionalisation years, where the protection of 
rights solely depended on general principles. In contrast to the minimal appli-
cation of the Charter and the general principles, EU citizenship has not played 
any substantive role in the austerity measures case law. This is primarily due 
to the limited list of rights attached to it, rendering it irrelevant in such cases, 
which are grounded in alleged fundamental rights’ infringements, thus demot-
ing citizenship from being ‘the fundamental status of Union citizens’.62
The limited applicability of these legal instruments left many wondering 
how fundamental rights can be among the foundational values of a constitu-
tionalised Union, if their use can be limited more easily than it can be invoked. 
It has also resulted in a gap in effective judicial protection, because of the lim-
ited routes available to access justice, the reluctance of the Courts to support 
those seeking to minimise the impact of the austerity measures, and finally 
because the Court’s rulings were largely based on reasons unconnected with 
 58 Article 13(3) of the esm Treaty.
 59 Opinion of AG Kokott, Pringle, cit., para. 176; Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 
Opinion, 11 February 2014, 2013/ 2277(INI), para. 11.
 60 Court of Justice, judgment of 20 September 2016, joined cases C- 8/ 15 P to C- 10/ 15 P, Ledra 
Advertising v. Commission and ECB, para. 59.
 61 Court of Justice, judgment of 27 February 2018, case C- 64/ 16, Associação Sindical dos 
Juízes Portugueses; See further, Court of Justice, judgment of 7 February 2019, case C- 49/ 
18, Escribano Vindel.
 62 Grzelczyk, cit., para. 31.
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law, but rather with politics.63 The reluctance of the Court is arguably based 
on the nature of the claims under dispute, which include complex econom-
ic situations and can have substantial impact on national democracy.64 The 
Court has therefore demonstrated a preference for ‘evading’ performing legal 
assessment, rather than embarking on judicial activism, so as to avoid the hos-
tile reaction which would ensue. A disparity in the pursuit of Union objectives 
is also demonstrated, namely that the Court seems more willing now to act 
to address the current rule of law crisis and protect the democratic judicial 
processes at the national and European level,65 than it did during the financial 
crisis. Interest in assessing new routes to equally safeguard citizens’ rights and 
Union’s objectives has been prompted, such as the use of EU citizenship in 
novel areas using the recent ‘substance of the rights doctrine’.
iv The Court’s ‘substance of the rights’ Doctrine
To tackle the limitations of EU law described above effectively, a broader scope 
of application of fundamental rights is needed, using a ‘living instrument’ 
with transformative qualities, such as the concept of EU citizenship, and the 
substance of the rights doctrine. Rottmann66 in particular has been correctly 
described as the foundation which paved the way towards the emancipation 
of EU citizenship from the limits inherent in its free movement origins.67 The 
Court indicated the importance of having due regard to EU law when exercis-
ing national powers within the sphere of nationality,68 and specifically ruling 
 63 Tomkin, J. (2013). Contradiction, Circumvention and Conceptual Gymnastics: The Impact 
of the Adoption of the esm Treaty on the State of European Democracy. German Law 
Journal 14 (1), pp. 169– 189, 180 et seq.; Repasi, R. (2017). Judicial protection against austerity 
measures in the euro area: Ledra and Mallis. Common Market Law Review 54 (4), pp. 1123– 
1155, 1123 et seq.; Ghailani, D. (2017). Violations of fundamental rights: collateral damage of 
the Eurozone crisis. In: Vanhercke, Natali, and Bouget, eds., Social policy in the European 
Union: state of play 2016. Brussels: etui, p. 158 et seq.
 64 Kriesi, H.  (2012). The Political Consequences of the Financial and Economic Crisis in 
Europe:  Electoral Punishment and Popular Protest. Swiss Political Science Review 18 
(4), pp.  518– 522, 519 et seq.; Funke, M., Schularick, M., and Trebesch, C.  (2016). Going 
to extremes:  Politics after financial crises 1870– 2014. European Economic Review 88, 
pp. 227– 260, 230.
 65 Court of Justice, judgment of 24 July 2018, case C- 216/ 18 PPU, Minister for Justice and 
Equality.
 66 Rottmann, cit.
 67 Lenaerts, K. (2015). EU citizenship and the European Court of Justice’s ‘stone- by- stone’ 
approach. International Comparative Jurisprudence 1 (1), pp. 1– 10, 2.
 68 Rottmann, cit., para. 41.
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that where an EU citizen is addressed by a decision withdrawing naturalisa-
tion, which causes him to lose the status and the rights conferred by Article 20 
tfeu, this falls by reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit 
of EU law.69 The citizenship- specific rights which a person would lose are thus 
emphasised, rather than the general human rights imperative, which indicates 
a substantial increase in the effect of EU citizenship on national citizenship.70
The Ruiz Zambrano case offered further insights into this development and 
extended the idea that Member States and the EU should leave the substan-
tive core of rights under EU citizenship intact.71 In answering the question of 
whether Article 20 tfeu has an autonomous character and serves as a suffi-
cient connection with EU law, the Court of Justice developed a jurisdictional 
test, whereby national measures are precluded if depriving EU citizens of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of EU citizenship rights.72 Consequent-
ly, third- country nationals obtain a derived right to reside in their children’s 
Member State of nationality under Article 20 tfeu when the factual condi-
tions of Ruiz Zambrano are met.73 This ruling constitutes one of the most in-
spiring of the last decade, primarily due to it marking a departure from the 
traditional cross- border concept, as the Court interpreted Article 20 tfeu as 
a sufficient link in itself,74 consequently extending the scope of application of 
EU law. Secondly, because the prohibition against a violation of the substance 
of rights has been applied as a self- standing EU test,75 while it had hitherto 
been applied within the context of the proportionality test. Despite the po-
tentially enormous implications of the doctrine, it has been characterised as 
frustratingly opaque,76 since little clarity was provided with regards to the cir-
cumstances under which it can be invoked.
Subsequent case law provided further clarity, on the conditions for trigger-
ing the recently developed doctrine. It is evident that not every limitation of a 
 69 Ibid., para. 42.
 70 Shaw, J.  (2011). Setting the scene:  the Rottmann case introduced. In:  Shaw, ed., Has the 
European Court of Justice Challenged Member State Sovereignty in Nationality Law? EUI 
Working Papers RSCAS 2011/ 62, p. 4.
 71 Ruiz Zambrano, cit.
 72 Ibid., para. 44.
 73 Ibid., para. 45.
 74 van Eijken, H., and de Vries, S.A. (2011). A New Route into the Promised Land, cit., p. 711.
 75 van den Brink, M.  (2017). The origins and the Potential Federalising Effects of the 
Substance of Rights Test. In:  Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism:  The Role of 
Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 90 et seq.
 76 Lansbergen, A., and Miller, N. (2011). European Citizenship Rights in Internal Situations: An 
Ambiguous Revolution. European Constitutional Law Review 7 (2), pp. 287– 307, 290 et seq.
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right will trigger the doctrine, but only its deprivation. In particular, the Court 
clarified in McCarthy77 that Article 21 tfeu is ‘applicable to situations that 
have the effect of depriving [a Union citizen] of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of the rights’ under EU citizenship or of ‘impeding the exercise of 
his right of free movement and residence’ within the Member States.78 The 
use of the doctrine, does not thus depend on an EU citizens’ age, but rather 
upon the seriousness of the restraint to the substance of the rights normally 
conferred. Therefore, a distinction is made whereby the ‘impeding effect’ re-
fers to the traditional line of case law requiring a cross- border link, without 
requiring the national measures to cause the loss of the status of Union citi-
zens in practice.79 If no cross- border situation occurs, only a deprivation of the 
substance of the rights will trigger EU law,80 requiring the national measure to 
create more than a ‘serious inconvenience’. Moreover, in Dereci,81 the Court in-
dicated that the ‘deprivation’ of the substance of the rights refers to situations 
in which the Union citizen not only has to leave the territory of the Member 
State, but the Union territory as a whole.82 The strict approach was confirmed 
in Yoshikazu lida,83 where the Court recalled that ‘purely hypothetical pros-
pects of exercising the right of freedom of movement’ and of that right being 
obstructed84 do not establish a sufficient link with EU law. This stricter ap-
proach85 emphasised the need to determine whether there is a relationship of 
dependency with the child’s primary carer,86 while a major part underlying the 
Court’s reasoning was clearly based on the respect for the division and balance 
of competences as enshrined in Article 5 teu. The Court of Justice affirmed 
in Rendón Marín that the prohibition under Article 20 tfeu, only applies in 
‘very specific’ situations, while this derived right cannot be refused when the 
 77 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 May 2011, case C- 434/ 09, McCarthy.
 78 McCarthy, cit., para. 56.
 79 Lenaerts, K. (2011). ‘Civis Europeus Sum’: from the cross- border link to the status of citizen 
of the Union. Online Journal on free movement of workers within the European Union 3, 
pp. 6– 18, 8 et seq.
 80 McCarthy, cit., para. 56.
 81 Court of Justice, judgment of 15 November 2011, case C- 256/ 11, Dereci and Others.
 82 Ibid., para. 66.
 83 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 November 2012, case C- 40/ 11, Iida.
 84 Ibid., para. 77.
 85 See further: Court of Justice, judgment of 8 May 2013, case C- 87/ 12, Ymeraga and Ymeraga- 
Tafarshiku; Court of Justice, judgment of 10 May 2017, case C- 133/ 15, Chávez- Vílchez and 
Others.
 86 Royston, T., and O’Brien, C. (2017). Breathing and not- incarcerated, estranged fathers do 
not automatically cancel out mothers’ Zambrano rights. Journal of Social Security Law 24 
(2), pp. D62- D64, D63.
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effectiveness of EU citizenship is to be disregarded.87 Therefore, in the Court’s 
view, any possible limitations on the substance of citizenship rights under-
mine its effectiveness.88 A de facto loss of a Union citizenship right is thus re-
quired, which rightly reduces the consequences of the test without being too 
intrusive.89 Although it is believed that fundamental rights should not be ruled 
out based on a narrow reading of the Treaties,90 the doctrine should be applied 
only when EU citizenship rights are deprived and cannot be remedied at the 
national level, to keep the test within the limits of an acceptable federal and 
legal balance within the EU.
The reasoning of Rottmann was more recently applied in Tjebbes,91 confirm-
ing the applicability of EU law and competence of the Court to answer the 
Raad van State’s (Council of State) question on the compatibility of Dutch na-
tionality law with the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship, even though the loss 
of nationality occurred by operation of a law rather than an express individual 
decision.92 The Tjebbes judgment has in fact been even more progressive in 
intervening into Member State nationality law, both procedurally and substan-
tively, by requiring an individual examination of any decision withdrawing na-
tionality having regard to a set of consequences linked to the status of Union 
citizenship. While this judicial progression, constitutionalising one of the few 
areas of executive discretion and dominance,93 could constitute the means to 
effectively protect the legal heritage of EU citizens, the Court followed a rather 
unexpected logic. Despite the jurisdictional examination, the ruling in Tjebbes 
tacitly overturns previous caselaw of the Court by holding that EU law does 
not preclude the withdrawal of EU citizenship based on an ex lege annulment, 
which comes without warning and based on no wrong- doing.94 In other words, 
 87 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 September 2016, case C- 165/ 14, Rendón Marín, para. 74.
 88 Neuvonen, P.J. (2017). EU citizenship and its “very specific” essence: Rendón Marín and CS. 
Common Market Law Review 54 (4), pp. 1201– 1220, 1205 et seq.
 89 See further: Ritter, C. (2006). Purely internal situations, reverse discrimination, Guimont, 
Dzodzi and Article 234. European Law Review 31 (5), pp. 690– 710; Wiesbrock, A.  (2012). 
Disentangling the ‘Union Citizenship Puzzle’? The McCarthy Case. European Law Review 
36 (6), pp. 861– 873; Iglesias Sánchez, S.  (2014). Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of 
the Union at a Crossroads: A Promising Alliance or a Dangerous Liaison? European Law 
Journal 20 (4), pp. 464– 481.
 90 D. Kochenov, On Tiles and Pillars:  EU Citizenship as a Federal Denominator, in 
D. Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p. 10.
 91 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2019, case C- 221/ 17, Tjebbes and others.
 92 Ibid., para. 20.
 93 S. Coutts, Bold and Thoughtful:  The Court of Justice Intervenes in Nationality Case 
Law: Case C- 221/ 17 Tjebbes, in European Law Blog, 25 March 2019, europeanlawblog.eu.
 94 D. Kochenov (2019). The Tjebbes Fail. European Papers 4 (1), pp. 319–336.
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while confirming and even extending the applicability of EU law when exam-
ining the loss/ acquisition of EU citizenship, the Court regressively made EU 
citizenship dependent upon the renewal of a passport before its expiration 
according to the facts of the case.
The judicial establishment of the doctrine, is of great significance, not only 
concerning its numerous implications, but also in relation to its prospects for 
further progress and development, towards a more constitutionalised Union. In 
particular, the judicial activism of the Court of Justice has marked a process of 
re- delimiting the scope of EU law, through the development of the constructiv-
ist nature of EU citizenship, while more meaning and value has been granted to 
the concept of EU citizenship and the rights attached thereto. More important-
ly, the ‘substance of the rights’ doctrine, has expanded the non- exhaustive list, 
towards including new rights. The ‘inter alia clause’ under Article 20(2) tfeu 
suggests that citizens can enjoy further rights, beyond those expressly stated 
therein, not only through the procedure enshrined under Article 25 tfeu but 
also through the judicial incorporation of unwritten rights.95 Following the re-
cent judicial developments, the list has indeed been expanded to include new 
rights, contrary to the allegation of McCarthy that the approach put forward in 
Ruiz Zambrano was only applicable to the ‘rights listed in Article 20(2) tfeu’.96 
This consideration is arguably rather unexpected and inaccurate since the re-
cent series of case law has protected EU citizens’ rights not expressly listed in 
Article 20(2) tfeu, such as the right against forced removal from the EU’s ter-
ritory or even the ability to benefit from equality in a wholly internal situation 
outside the scope of EU law.97 It is therefore argued that the extent of Union 
citizenship rights is much broader than what is defined in a textual sense.98
v The Way Forward: the ‘Internal Applicability of EU Law’ Test
The recently developed ‘substance of the rights’ doctrine, seems to have the 
potential to change the architecture of the fundamental rights protection, to-
wards enhancing the modern protection of EU citizens’ rights and overcoming 
 95 Kochenov, D.  (2017). On Tiles and Pillars:  EU Citizenship as the Federal Denominator. 
In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, cit., p. 25 et seq.
 96 Lenaerts, K. (2011). ‘Civis Europeus Sum’, cit., p. 9.
 97 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 September 2006, case C- 300/ 04, Eman and Sevinger, para. 
61; Besselink, L.M. (2008). Annotation of Spain v UK, Eman en Sevinger, and ECtHR Case 
Seviger and Eman v The Netherlands. Common Market Law Review 45 (3), pp. 787– 813.
 98 Kochenov, D.  (2017). On Tiles and Pillars:  EU Citizenship as the Federal Denominator. 
In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, cit., p. 26 et seq.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Katerina Kalaitzaki - 9789004433076
Downloaded from Brill.com12/15/2020 10:53:09AM
via free access
Broadening the Application of EU Fundamental Rights 59
the deficiencies identified. This can be done by establishing a connection of 
the substance of the rights doctrine with the Charter rights and/ or the funda-
mental rights as general principles of EU law, aiming to grant EU citizens a core 
of rights other than those already listed in Article 20(2).
The proposed way forward, namely the ‘internal applicability of EU law’ test 
will be built on two main starting points. It will be firstly based on the idea that 
the non- exhaustive list under Article 20(2) tfeu, should always be interpreted 
in compliance with Article 2 teu which the Member States are also obliged 
to comply with. The second starting point is that beyond the scope of Article 
51(1) of the Charter, fundamental rights issues are left to national legislation 
and judiciary, provided that they safeguard the values enshrined under Article 
2 teu. The recent developments have, however, allowed some room for EU in-
tervention, in cases that are normally considered as wholly internal and/ or as 
falling outside the scope of EU law.99 The proposal brings the classic doctrine 
a step further, by proposing a three- step jurisdictional test which will allow EU 
fundamental rights, besides the ones under the list of Article 20 tfeu, to be 
specifically used in purely internal situations. The test particularly involves a 
judicial incorporation combing a dynamic reading of Article 2 teu, Article 20 
tfeu and the general principles of EU law.
1 First Step: Delimiting the Test in Accordance with Article 2 teu
The first step of the test consists in the delimitation of the scope of application 
of the proposal using Article 2 teu, in a different way from von Bogdandy’s 
‘reverse Solange’.100 This article supports that the ‘inter alia clause’ under the 
non- exhaustive list of Article 20(2) tfeu should be interpreted as including 
the Union’s foundational values, which also work as general legal standards of 
protection for EU citizens. However, broadening the scope of application of 
fundamental rights cannot be achieved merely by extending the list of EU cit-
izenship rights already falling within the sphere of the substance of the rights 
doctrine. It is necessary to focus on cases which require EU intervention by de-
limiting the scope of application of the proposal to the essential core of rights, 
which represents the minimum circle of fundamental rights common to the 
Member States, which cannot be diminished without the right in question los-
ing its value either for the right holder or for society as a whole.101 The first step 
 99 von Bogdandy, A. et al. (2012). Reverse Solange – Protecting the essence of fundamental 
rights against EU Member States. Common Market Law Review 49 (2), pp. 489– 519, 490.
 100 Ibid., p. 489.
 101 Brkan, M.  (2018). The Concept of Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU Legal 
Order:  Peeling the Onion to its Core. European Constitutional Law Review 14 (2), 
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will essentially elaborate this idea through Article 2 teu102 and embody an 
assessment of the exact content of its values.
Although Article 2 teu works as a legal standard of assessment, it cannot be 
interpreted as meaning that the Member States are fully bound by the entire fun-
damental rights acquis, since this is expressly prevented by the Charter and the 
Treaty itself.103 On the contrary, it aims at safeguarding the essentials which are 
‘common to the Member States’,104 covering long- standing national traditions105 
used by several constitutional courts, and infringements of certain rights which 
cannot be justified in accordance with the cjeu’s case law.106 For instance, in Tele2 
Sverige,107 the cjeu ruled that the right to freedom of expression (Article 11 of the 
Charter), constitutes one of the EU’s foundational values under Article 2 teu and 
it is an essential foundation of a pluralist democratic society.108
The right to effective judicial protection, largely unprotected and exposed 
during the financial crisis, also falls under Article 2 teu, not only because it 
constitutes a component of the ‘rule of law’, but also because it is undoubtedly 
connected to the ‘respect for human rights’. Relatively early in the case law, 
the Court insisted that the Union is based on the rule of law and has built up 
in its case law a catalogue of elements inherent to the rule of law, within the 
meaning of Article 2 teu,109 including the principle of separation of powers,110 
the principle of effective judicial protection111 and effective application of EU 
law.112 Consequently, a violation of the rule of law principle under Article 2 
pp. 332– 368, 340 et seq.; Rivers, J. (2006). Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review. 
The Cambridge Law Journal 65 (1), pp. 174– 207, 176 et seq.
 102 Conclusions of the Presidency of 21– 22 June 1993 (SN 180/ 1/ 93).
 103 Article 51(1) of the Charter and Article 6 teu.
 104 Von Bogdandy, A. et al. (2012). Reverse Solange, cit., p. 500.
 105 The need to protect the essence of fundamental rights and not to impose any unjust limita-
tions is expressly enshrined in most of the national Constitutions or EU Charters: Article 
19(2) German Basic Law, Article 4(2) Czech Fundamental Rights Charter, Article 8(2) 
Hungarian Constitution, Article 30(3) Polish Constitution, Article 18(3) Portuguese 
Constitution, Article 49(2) Rumanian Constitution, Article 13(4) Slovakian Constitution, 
Article 53(1) Spanish Constitution.
 106 von Bogdandy, A. et al. (2012). Reverse Solange, cit., p. 491.
 107 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 December 2016, joined cases C- 203/ 15 and C- 698/ 15, Tele2 
Sverige AB.
 108 Nakanishi, Y.  (2018). The EU’s Rule of Law and the Judicial Protection of Rights. 
Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics 46, pp. 1– 12, 5.
 109 The term ‘rule of law’ was enshrined in Article 6 teu by the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997.
 110 Court of Justice, judgment of 10 November 2016, case C- 477/ 16 ppu, Kovalkovas.
 111 Court of Justice, judgment of 28 March 2017, case C- 72/ 15, Rosneft; Schrems, cit.
 112 Nakanishi, Y.  (2018). The EU’s Rule of Law and the Judicial Protection of Rights, cit., 
p. 11; Brkan, M. (2018). The Concept of Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU Legal 
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teu would likely aggravate a fundamental rights infringement, undermine 
the basic foundations of the EU legal order and the substantive meaning of 
Union citizenship.113 Such infringements, amounting in their extent and se-
riousness to the total inexistence of the fundamental right’s essence, cannot 
be adequately remedied within a Member State, but rather at the Union level, 
through the use of a federalising tool.114 However, the use of Article 2 teu in 
the proposed test, does not aim to establish its infringement, but is rather used 
as a safety valve towards including only the ‘essentials’ within Article 20(2).
2 Second and Third Step: Another Use of Rights
After defining the essence of Article 2 teu – delimiting the content eligible 
to be judicially incorporated into the ‘inter alia’ list – the next step is to assess 
the scope of application of the respective Charter right or general principle, 
to determine its compatibility with the doctrine. The infringement under dis-
pute must finally constitute a deprivation in accordance with the Zambrano 
doctrine and not a mere inconvenience or impediment, so as to satisfy the 
proposed test and challenge rights- violating measures outside a strict interpre-
tation of the scope of EU law.
As a result of this divergence in interpretations of Article 51(1), the test’s 
wording is not entirely unambiguous.115 The question is thus to what extent 
the Court of Justice could interpret the scope of the Charter so as to fall with-
in the substance of the rights doctrine. On the one hand, if the ‘implementa-
tion’ concept is adopted according to Åkerberg Fransson,116 the Charter can be 
considered applicable in situations ‘falling within the scope of EU law’ and be 
invoked in relation to the substance of the rights doctrine.117 On the contrary, 
if the Court cleaves to its narrow interpretation, this does not necessarily pre-
vent the application of EU fundamental rights in purely internal situations,118 
depending on the extent to which the narrow scope of the Charter can restrain 
Order, cit., p 340 et seq.; Court of Justice, judgment of 20 November 2017, case C- 441/ 17, 
Commission v. Poland; Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit., para. 31.
 113 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro delivered on 12 September 2007, case C- 380/ 05, Centro 
Europa 7, para. 22; Guidance can be drawn from the interpretation given to the criterion 
of a ‘serious and persistent breach’ under Article 7(2) teu.
 114 von Bogdandy, A. et al. (2012). Reverse Solange, cit., p. 501.
 115 The explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007) OJ C 303/ 02, state 
that the Charter ‘is only binding of the Member States when they act in the scope of 
Union law’.
 116 Åkerberg Fransson, cit.
 117 van den Brink, M.J. (2012). EU Citizenship and EU Fundamental Rights, cit., p. 282.
 118 Ibid., p. 287.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Katerina Kalaitzaki - 9789004433076
Downloaded from Brill.com12/15/2020 10:53:09AM
via free access
62 Kalaitzaki
the scope of those general principles as well.119 The prevailing view in this ar-
ticle is that the scope of application of the Charter is narrower than that of 
general principles of EU law and the narrow scope of the former cannot affect 
that of the latter.
After the pragmatic Opinion of AG Bot in Scattolon,120 the Court in Asso-
ciação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses clarified that Article 19(1) teu can be ap-
plied in full, even if the Charter does not apply, in a far- reaching demonstration 
of the Court’s judicial activism in favour of European integration.121 It is there-
fore safe to say that at least in the case of effective judicial protection, gener-
al principles of EU law have a broader scope of application than the Charter 
rights, with the latter not affecting the former’s application. Accordingly, the 
argument put forward by AG Mengozzi that the Charter prevents the inclu-
sion of EU fundamental rights in the substance of the rights doctrine is not 
entirely correct,122 or at least is not the only possible explanation. That being 
the case and due to the complexity of the Charter’s scope, fundamental rights 
as general principles are more likely to be found eligible to be included in the 
substance of the rights doctrine as part of the new jurisdictional test.
3 The Paradigm of Effective Judicial Protection
A link between fundamental rights as general principles of EU law and the 
substance of the rights doctrine is accordingly attainable, provided that the 
relevant principle of EU law is an ‘essential’ under Article 2 teu and its scope 
of application is broader than that of Article 20 tfeu. Although this possibility 
is arguably achievable for several principles, that of effective judicial protec-
tion is the most suitable for examination, since it has been a vulnerable and 
constantly- violated right during the recent financial crisis, and recent judicial 
developments have substantially added to its significance.123
The concept of ‘effective judicial protection’ is dual- faced, occasionally referred 
to by the Courts as a self- standing ‘principle’124 of EU law or as a ‘fundamental 
 119 Editorial Comments (2010). The Scope of Application of the General Principles of Union 
law: An Ever Expanding Union. Common Market Law Review 47 (6), pp. 1589– 1596, 1590.
 120 Opinion of AG Bot, Scattolon, cit., para. 120.
 121 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit., para. 29.
 122 Opinion of AG Mengozzi delivered on 29 September 2001, case C- 256/ 11, Dereci and 
Others, paras. 37– 39.
 123 Alston P., and Weiler, J.H.H. (1999). An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights 
Policy: The European Union and Human Rights. In: Alston, ed., The EU and Human Rights. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 200.
 124 Court of Justice, judgment of 25 July 2002, case C- 50/ 00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores 
v. Council, para. 39; Court of Justice, judgment of 1 April 2004, case C- 263/ 02 P, Commission 
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right’ under the Charter.125 It inter alia entrusts the responsibility to ensure judi-
cial review in the EU legal order both to the Court of Justice and to the national 
courts and tribunals.126 As discussed above, the Court made clear in Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses that the scope of application of Article 19 teu is 
broader than that of Article 47 of the Charter.127 Through a particularly interest-
ing legal reasoning, the Court built on ‘operationalising’ Article 2 teu, by stating 
that Article 19 teu, ‘gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of law’.128 
Without offering any explanation on the applicability of the Charter, the Court 
overcame the barrier in Article 51(1) and exclusively relied on Article 19(1) teu, 
merely by requiring the existence of a virtual link between the relevant national 
measures and EU law and thus enabled natural and legal persons to challenge a 
broader set of national measures using this route.129 This ruling has created a na-
tional legal obligation to safeguard judicial independence based on a combined 
reading of Articles 2, 4(3) and 19(1) teu, regardless of whether the situation falls 
within the scope of EU law. The judgment has far- reaching consequences for ef-
fective judicial protection, since the Court went beyond the minimum effective 
necessity of the national remedies needed to ensure the application of EU law 
and gave the green light to proceed with the proposed jurisdictional test.130
The new approach towards Article 19 teu, is believed to have a great resem-
blance with the substance of the rights doctrine, since both were developed 
by the Court of Justice as the main actor, through the exercise of judicial activ-
ism. Moreover, they aimed to overcome the barrier created by the restricting 
provision of the Charter’s scope, while at the same time, both resulted in the 
enhancement of citizens’ rights protection. There are however significant dis-
similarities between them, namely the substance of the rights doctrine con-
stitutes a tool for claiming EU legal jurisdiction, which is only triggered when 
v. Jégo- Quéré, para. 29; Court of Justice, judgment of 16 July 2009, case C- 12/ 08, Mono Car 
Styling, para. 46.
 125 Court of Justice, judgment of 29 January 2009, case C- 275/ 06, Promusicae, para. 
62; Leczykiewicz, D.  (2010). ‘Effective Judicial Protection’ of Human Rights After 
Lisbon: Should National Courts be Empowered to Review EU Secondary Law. European 
Law Review 35 (3), pp. 326– 348, 330.
 126 Nic Shuibhne, N.  (2013). The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law:  Constitutional 
Responsibility and the Court of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 127 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit., para. 32.
 128 Ibid., paras. 29– 38.
 129 Ibid., paras. 27– 29; Pech, L., and Platon, S. (2018). Rule of Law backsliding in the EU: The 
Court of Justice to the rescue? Some thoughts on the ecj ruling in Associação Sindical 
dos Juízes Portugueses. EU Law Analysis, available at http:// eulawanalysis.blogspot.com.
cy/ 2018/ 03/ rule- of- law- backsliding- in- eu- court- of.html.
 130 Pech, L., and Platon, S. (2018). Rule of Law backsliding in the EU, cit.
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a deprivation of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights under 
Article 20 tfeu occurs.131 It can thus be characterised as a moderately invasive 
approach, which must be used as a last resort to preserve the effectiveness of 
EU law. In contrast, the development of Article 19(1) teu132 constitutes a new 
general obligation, regardless of whether the matter falls within the scope of 
EU law. It is therefore more invasive, since it essentially created a federal stan-
dard of review for the principle of judicial independence that can now be di-
rectly invoked before national courts, demonstrating that the Court of Justice 
does not hesitate to issue courageous decisions to secure EU law.133
This article proposes a practical tool for claiming jurisdiction under EU law, 
rather than a general obligation, to enable the review of national breaches of 
the rule of law occurring outside the areas covered by the EU’s acquis. Beyond 
the scope of the Charter, applicants challenging austerity measures have not 
been able successfully to invoke EU fundamental rights, although numerous 
assistance packages were clearly granted through EU- established mechanisms, 
unless the substance of the rights doctrine were triggered and the matter were 
brought within the scope of EU law. According to the current proposal, if an 
infringed right whose substance had been deprived by a national measure was 
not expressed within the list of Article 20(2), the ‘inter alia’ clause applies, sug-
gesting that citizens can also enjoy the protection of other rights.134 The delim-
itation of the ‘eligible’ rights is best achieved using Article 2 teu, without aim-
ing to establish its infringement, but it is rather used as a boundaries- indicator. 
Subsequently, the scope of application of the respective Charter right or gener-
al principle, is assessed to determine its compatibility with the doctrine.
vi Concluding Remarks
Recent judicial developments, including the substance of the rights doctrine, 
have built on the constitutional perspective of EU citizenship,135 by inter alia 
 131 Ruiz Zambrano, cit., para. 44.
 132 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit.
 133 Taborowski, M. (2018). cjeu Opens the Door for the Commission to Reconsider Charges 
against Poland. Verfassungsblog, available at https:// verfassungsblog.de/ cjeu- opens- the- 
door- for- the- commission- to- reconsider- charges- against- poland/ .
 134 See, Eeckhout, P. (2002). The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, cit., p. 980 et seq.; Da Cruz 
Vilaça, J.L., and Silveira, A. (2017). The European Federalisation Process and the Dynamics 
of Fundamental Rights. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p. 133 et seq.
 135 Hailbronner K., and Thym, D.  (2011). Case C- 34/ 09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v.  Office 
national de l’emploi (ONEm). Common Market Law Review 48 (4), pp. 1253– 1270.
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proving that the list of rights the Treaties express is not exhaustive, but can 
rather incorporate ‘unwritten’ rights.136 More importantly, they have granted 
further opportunities for reinforcing EU fundamental rights protection, such 
as the proposed expansion of the substance of the rights doctrine towards in-
cluding the principle of effective judicial protection, when a deprivation of the 
substance of the rights under the principle of effective judicial protection oc-
curs. Nevertheless, strong objections against such a proposal can be raised. The 
proposed expansion of the doctrine can easily be perceived as a threat to the 
system of allocation of competences. However, no such contradiction occurs, 
because Article 2 teu is employed as a safety valve, confining the expansion 
of the proposal with the requirement for a deprivation of the substance of the 
rights, which safeguards national identities, provided that the foundations and 
the effectiveness of EU law are not eroded.
Moreover, conflicts with other Treaty provisions can emerge, including with 
Article 25(2), which allegedly prevents the desired judicial incorporation of 
fundamental rights into citizenship status. However, this does not constitute 
an absolute obstacle to judicial incorporation, since the procedural limitations 
are read as applying to the legislature only,137 thus ensuring the constitutional 
legitimacy of a judicial incorporation. The use of Article 2 teu could also raise 
arguments that the ‘values on which the Union is built’ are illusory in a num-
ber of respects.138 Although an acquis on values would give it more weight, the 
increasing use of the provision in the Court’s case law proves the opposite.139 
Moreover, no conflict with Article 7 teu can arise, since the proposal is not 
intending to turn Article 2 teu into black- letter law or establish its violation, 
but rather to ‘operationalise’ it, by shaping the essence of the values expressed 
therein, which also constitute basic rights to be enjoyed by EU citizens.140
 136 Kochenov, D.  (2013). The Essence of EU Citizenship Emerging from the Last Ten Years 
of Academic Debate:  Beyond the Cherry Blossoms and the Moon? International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 62, pp. 97– 136, 100.
 137 Düsterhaus, D. (2017). EU Citizenship and Fundamental Rights: Contradictory, Converging 
or Complementary. In: Kochenov, ed., EU Citizenship and Federalism, cit., p. 643 et seq.
 138 Kochenov, D.  (2013). On Policing Article 2 teu Compliance  – Reverse Solange And 
Systemic Infringements Analyzed. Polish Yearbook of International Law 33, pp.  145– 170, 
150 et seq.
 139 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, cit.; General Court, judgment of 3 February 
2017, case T- 646/ 13, Minority SafePack  – one million signatures for diversity in Europe 
v.  Commission; Court of Justice, order of 17 July 2014, case C- 505/ 13, Yumer; Court of 
Justice, order of 12 June 2014, case C- 28/ 14, Pańczyk; General Court, judgment of 10 May 
2016, case T- 529/ 13, Izsák and Dabis v. Commission.
 140 Kochenov, D. (2013). On Policing Article 2 teu Compliance, cit., p. 160.
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All in all, the proposal is fully in line with the doctrinal and jurispruden-
tial approaches towards Union citizenship and will arguably allow citizens 
facing effective judicial protection violations, including those faced during 
the financial crisis, to bring their cases within the scope of EU law, provided 
that the requirements described above are satisfied. Further rights can also 
be protected through this proposal if the test is satisfied, with equality and 
non- discrimination rights constituting the most likely candidates, considering 
that during the crisis, the disputed measures were commonly challenged be-
fore the Court as being discriminatory and that the general principle of non- 
discrimination has long been established within the EU legal order. Although 
the proposal’s reach is limited, it would definitely overcome the barrier im-
posed by Article 51(1) of the Charter and safeguard the ‘substance’ of the ‘es-
sential’ rights which must be included in the list of EU citizenship rights. It is 
also believed that such an incorporation in practice would prompt the Court to 
be more willing to claim jurisdiction, while the current imbalance between the 
EU’s purposes would be largely restored, by acknowledging that the enjoyment 
of rights continued to lie at the heart of the EU, even during the financial crisis.
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